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5 Fringe Benefits and Employment
Masanori Hashimoto 
Ohio State University
The past few decades have witnessed dramatic growth in the fringe 
benefits component of total labor compensation in the United States 
and other countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
Development (Hart et al. 1988). According to the conventional wis 
dom, an exogenous increase in nonwage labor costs adversely impacts 
employment. For instance, researchers have linked increases in quasi- 
fixed labor costs with reductions in employment.' Often overlooked, 
however, is the fact that voluntarily provided fringe benefits have 
grown by as much as legally required fringe benefits over the past 40 
years, with the voluntary component in fact outpacing the legally 
required component after the early 1980s. Although legally required 
fringe benefits may be viewed as exogenous for the purposes of model 
ing, voluntarily provided fringe benefits must be treated as endogenous 
in any comprehensive analysis. 2 In this chapter, we undertake just such 
an analysis. In particular, we discuss a market level model in which 
wages and employment are permitted to respond to changes in the 
demand for and the cost of fringe benefits and in which increases in 
legally mandated fringe benefits are permitted to alter the market equi 
librium.
Anticipating the results, the employment and wage effects of 
increases in nonwage payments vary with the source of the increase. 
We analyze the following three such sources: 1) an increase in worker 
demand for benefits, 2) a reduction in the cost of providing benefits, 
and 3) an increase in legally mandated benefits. Although these are 
obvious sources, the literature does not seem to have taken them into 
account. Our analysis is conducted primarily in a model in which no 
distinction is drawn between the number of workers and the hours of 
work or between straight-time and overtime hours. The final sections 
discuss how the results are altered by incorporating such distinctions 




Figure 1 shows that, in the United States, both legally required and 
voluntary fringe benefits grew significantly over the past 40 years, with 
the voluntary component outpacing the legally required component 
after the early 1980s. As Table 1 makes clear, growth in Social Secu 
rity was the single most important factor behind the upsurge in legally 
required fringe benefits between 1951 and 1994. As for voluntary 
fringe benefits, growth in health and medical insurance far outpaced 
growth in any other component. Table 2 depicts industry differences in 
the changes in nonwage payments from 1966 to 1994. In general, the 
percentage of nonwage labor costs in total labor costs rose steadily 
during this period, with growth for all industries combined reaching 
almost 48 percent. This rate of increase varied among industries, rang 
ing between 1.2 percent in finance to 67.9 percent in wood products. It 
was higher for manufacturing industries overall (over 50 percent) than 
for nonmanufacturing industries (39 percent).
The observed increase in the importance of nonwage labor costs 
most likely affected the relative attractiveness of various labor inputs, 
for example, part-time versus full-time workers or additional hiring of 
full-time workers versus additional hours worked by incumbent work 
ers. In particular, the existing analyses predict that part-time workers 
should have become more attractive than full-time workers and that 
additional hours should have become more attractive than additional 
hiring.
It is unclear whether these predictions are supported by the data, at 
least on the aggregate correlation level. Figure 2 indicates that there is 
no discernible relationship across industries between changes in the 
ratio of full-time to total employment and changes in the importance of 
nonwage labor costs. Figure 3 shows that, if anything, hours worked 
per employee decreased in industries that experienced increases in 
nonwage labor costs, a finding that seems at odds with the theoretical 
prediction. Although a multivariate analysis using a more comprehen 
sive data set is needed to test these predictions rigorously, the market- 
level theory discussed in this essay suggests that such ambiguous find 
ings are to be expected.
Figure 1 Fringe Benefits of Workers in Firms Surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce 
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Table 1 Components of Fringe Benefits in Firms Surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce. Indices of Benefits as a 


































































































































SOURCE: See Appendix A.






































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Calculated from Table 6 of Employee Benefits (Chamber of Commerce of the United States, various years) by taking 
l/(l+(100/x)), where x is employee benefits.






m «0 5000 ;
ro • * '
0 *
S .
1 ———— - _____ ̂
1 * 1 | T""TB"ftftQffc
if -30.00 • -2000 -10.6*0 * 0
*•— ^ A A. ^
0 * *
B •(0





^ -1 0000 - 
-1 5000 -
4 b = -0 005507, 
(0 003505) 
/-statistic = -1 571153, 
Significance = 0 94039656, 





*• + * v* * .
A* ***** * *T **  ^ » *» I* —————— « ————— I —————————————— I
)0 ^ 10.00 *" ——— • 2000- ———— flnnn 4000
•





% Change in Quasi-Fixed Non-Wage Labor Costs
Figure 3 Nonmanufacturing Industries (U.S. Chamber of Commerce Survey)
2 0000 T
b = -0 005498, 
(0011136)
f-statistic = - 0.493706, 
Significance = 0 68824484, 
Correlation coefficient = -0 067034
35.00
-2 5000 -L 
% Change in Quasi-Fixed Non-Wage Labor Costs
Fringe Benefits and Employment 237
THEORY AND PREDICTIONS
In contrast to the conventional approach of analyzing a single 
firm's decision, we consider a model that addresses the effects of 
increased fringe benefits on market wages and employment. To focus 
on the bare essentials of the analysis, we restrict ourselves to a simple 
model that abstracts from the distinction between the size of the work 
force and the hours of work per worker. Following this simple model, 
we consider the implications from an extended model that includes 
such a distinction.
Beginning first with a firm level analysis and then extending to the 
market level analysis, suppose that an industry consists of identical 
firms whose production functions are given by
Q = F(n) (1)
where Q is output and n is a firm's level of employment. The market 
level of employment is then given by E = kn, where k is the total num 
ber of firms. Each firm faces a labor expense function,
Q = Q(n,h,G) = whn + C(G,n)n, (2)
where w is the wage and G is the quantity of fringe benefits per worker. 
Equation 2 is assumed to satisfy
Ci > 0, Cn > 0, C2 ^0, C12 = C21 ±0, C22 = 0,
so that the marginal cost of G is positive and rising (Cj > 0, Cn > 0). 
Equation 2 allows for the existence of either internal diseconomies or 
economies in providing fringe benefits. Thus, as the firm expands its 
workforce, the cost per worker of providing fringe benefits might 
increase or decrease, depending upon whether scale diseconomies (C2 
> 0) or economies (C2 < 0) exist. More importantly, the sign of C12 = 
C21 is critical to the analysis. We interpret C12 < 0 as an indicator of 
cross-economies of scale and C12 > 0 as an indicator cross-disecono 
mies of scale. Cross-economies of scale (diseconomies of scale) imply
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that the marginal cost of G falls (rises) with the size of the workforce. 
For simplicity, we assume that C22 = 0.
The /th employee is assumed to view G as having a constant mar 
ginal value of A, dollars, making her indifferent between receiving A, 
dollars in w or in G. To simplify, we assume that all employees have 
the same marginal value, A. As a result, 8w/3G = -A from the 
employer's perspective; if G is increased by one unit, all employees are 
willing to work for A dollars less in w.
An employer selects the optimum n and G by solving the following 
problem:
Max ji(n, G) = pF(n) - [ w + C(G, n)]n, ., .
n,G (J)
where p is the product price. The first order conditions are given by
= pF'(n) -[w + C(G, n) + nC2 ] = 0 and (4a)
= 0. (4b) 
A firm's labor demand is traced by Eq. 4a, rewritten as:
w = pF'(n) - [C(G, n) + nC2 ]. (4a*)
The optimum quantity of G is given by Eq. 4b, implying that the mar 
ginal cost of G is equal to A dollars at the optimum point.
Allowing for the product price changes that occur as all firms 
change outputs, the market demand curves for labor can be obtained by 
horizontally summing the firms' demand curves. To facilitate the anal 
ysis, we linearize the market demand curves as follows (see Appendix 
B for the details of this linearization).
where w* is the employers' wage offer, w is employment, and a, t|, p, 
and P are parameters. The expression represents the cost of providing 
G, and P depends on G if there are cross-scale effects in providing the 
benefits. Equations 2 and 4a* imply the following restrictions:
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P/dG2 =0, (6)
where the condition d$ldG^ 0 corresponds to C, 2 JO and the condi 
tion J2 p / dG2 = 0 corresponds to C12 = 0 (see Appendix B). Figure 4 
depicts the demand curves associated with three different quantities of 
G. If the marginal cost of G slopes upward, the demand curves diverge 
as G is increased, reflecting the rising cost of fringe benefits.
The supply side of the model is straightforward. As emphasized 
earlier, workers are assumed to be homogeneous while w and G are 
assumed to be perfectly substitutable at a rate of A dollars per unit of 
G. As a result, the market supply of labor depends upon w + AG. 
Because workers are assumed homogeneous, the supply curve depicted 
as a function of w is horizontal and shifts down as G is increased 
according to the following equation.
ws = y - AG, (7)
where w5 is the asking wage and y (>0) and A (>0) are parameters. 
Figure 5 depicts the supply curves.
The competitive market equilibrium is the solution that maximizes 
the sum total of the surpluses for both employers and employees. The 
process of reaching this equilibrium involves two steps. First, the mar 
ket optimizes on the E associated with various quantities of G. This 
optimization generates a locus of the intersections of demand and sup 
ply curves corresponding to different values of G. Second, the market 
chooses the optimum quantity of G by equating the marginal cost of G 
with its marginal value. By doing so, the market in effect selects a 
point on the intersection locus that maximizes the sum of the surpluses. 
Figure 6 depicts the demand and supply curves together for three dif 
ferent levels of G as well as the corresponding intersection points on 
the intersection locus L.
The market equilibrium—the intersection of demand and supply 





= [a - (t|G + pG2 )- y + KG\E + 0.5(3E2 + Constant.
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Figure 4 Demand Curves
w
Figure 5 Supply Curves
W
[G2 >G1 >G0 ]
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The first order conditions are given by
0 and (9a) 
- -[r| + 2pG - Q.5(d$ /dG)E]E + kE = 0 (9b)
Equation 9a optimizes Z with respect to E, resulting in a locus of inter 
sections between the demand and supply curves for different values of 
G. Equation 9b optimizes on G, equating the marginal cost (the first 
term) with the marginal value (the second term). Equations 9a and 9b 
together describe the point of market equilibrium. 3
Figure 7 portrays the market equilibrium for three cases: no cross- 
scale effects (dft/dG = 0) cross-economies of scale (d$/dG > 0), and 
cross-diseconomies of scale (dft/dG < 0). The L curve is the locus of 
the intersections of the demand and supply curves for the different lev 
els of G. There is a unique L curve associated with each of these three 
values of d$ldG; however, in Figure 7, only one L curve is depicted to 
conserve space. Moving downward along this locus, G is increased 
and w is decreased. We should point out that the market equilibrium 
level of employment is not necessarily at its maximum attainable level. 
In particular, Figure 7 shows that if there are cross-scale effects (d$l 
dG * 0), equilibrium employment is less than the maximum feasible 
level of employment on the relevant L curve.4 Only in the absence of 
cross-scale effects (d$/dG = 0) is equilibrium employment at its maxi 
mum feasible level (see Appendix C for a proof).
We are now in a position to evaluate the effects of nonwage pay 
ments on employment. Since G is endogenous in our model, changes 
in its magnitude must be traced to changes in worker demand for, and 
the cost of, G. These exogenous factors are represented by K and r|, 
respectively. In addition, we evaluate the effects of changes in legally 
required fringe benefits on employment and wages.
Changes in the Demand for G
A secular increase in nonwage payments can arise as a result of an 
increase in the demand for fringe benefits. Such an increase in demand 
occurs if, for example, a new law taxes nonwage benefits less heavily 
than wage earnings or if real income grows and fringe benefits are
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Figure 6 Intersection Locus
Figure 7 Market Equilibria
w
B (dp/dG > 0)
A (dp/dG = 0) 
C (dp/dG <0)
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superior goods. An increased demand for G is represented by an 
increase in A,, yielding the following comparative statics results:
dGld\ = (1 /|//|)[-P + 0.5G(d(3 / dG)]E (10a)
dEldk = (1 /|//|)[2pG + 0.5E(d$ I dG)]E, (lOb)
Clearly, if there are no cross-scale effects (d$ldG = 0)or if there are 
cross-economies of scale (d$ldG > 0), both equations are positive so 
that both G and E increase with A. In other words, an increase in 
worker demand for fringe benefits increases both the amount of bene 
fits provided and the level of employment. If a secular increase in non- 
wage payments is the result of an increased demand for these 
payments, such an increase in benefits should have the effect of stimu 
lating employment.
If there are cross-diseconomies of scale (dft/dG < 0), conditions 
lOa and lOb seem to suggest that either G or £ or both could decrease 
when A, increases. Such an outcome seems implausible, however, 
because it would imply that, as employers expand G in response to the 
increased demand for it, cross-diseconomies cause the cost of provid 
ing fringe benefits to rise, forcing employers to reduce the quantities of 
both G and E. For cross-diseconomies to remain operative, however, 
the aggregate amount of G must rise. On the basis of this argument, 
we conjecture that G, and possibly E, increase even in this case.
Because w = ws = w at the point of equilibrium, the effect on 
the wage is ascertained by evaluating the effect of a change in A, on ws, 
or
G (10c)
Equation 10 implies that, if G and E increase in response to an 
increase in the demand for G, then dwld\ is negative and the wage 
falls. Employees, in effect, trade their wages for larger benefits.
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Changes in the Cost of G
Nonwage payments may also increase as a result of a decrease in 
the cost of providing fringe benefits. A change in the cost of G is rep 
resented here by a change in rj. Not surprisingly, the comparative stat 
ics analysis reveals that cost effects are mirror images of demand 
effects. In other words,
and (lla)
If (dfi/dG > 0) both G and E increase when r| falls. Thus, if the 
observed increase in nonwage benefits is the result of a decrease in the 
cost of providing benefits, employment as well as benefits should rise. 
As in the case of increased demand for fringe benefits, even if there are 
cross-diseconomies (d$ldG < 0), we conjecture that G, and possibly E, 
increase when costs fall.
The wage effect is evaluated from the following equation:
dw/dn = A,(dGdn). (lie)
The term dw I dT\ is positive when (dfi/dG > 0). If a decrease in r\ is 
the cause of the observed increase in nonwage payments, then, as G 
and E increase in response, w should decrease.
Effects of Government Control of G
As Figure 1 demonstrates, legally required benefits have risen over 
time. If a government regulates the quantity of employer provided 
fringe benefits, then G in the previous analysis is replaced by the man 
dated quantity, G . Given that dw I dG = —A, < 0, it is clear that the 
wage will fall unambiguously when G is increased. The effect on 
employment is not clear-cut, however.
To begin, E is now the only endogenous variable, making 
3Z/8E1 = 0 the only first-order condition. This first-order condition 
yields the following optimum level of employment: 5
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31 (12)
The effect of an increased G on employment is given by
(13)
+ (d{3 / dG) x (a positive term).
Suppose the market is initially at its competitive equilibrium so 
that G = G*, where G* is the competitive equilibrium level of the 
benefits. In this case, the term (V| + 2pG - A,)/(37 is zero because 
(r| + 2pG)and A, are, respectively, the marginal cost and marginal 
value of G. We already know that in the absence of cross-scale effects 
(d(3 I dG = 0), the competitive equilibrium corresponds to the maxi 
mum feasible level of employment. 6 It is clear, therefore, that the 
introduction of legally required benefits lowers employment regardless 
of whether the mandated G is larger or smaller than G * . In other 
words, there is little that the government can do to increase employ 
ment by regulating G.
If there are cross-economies of scale (d$ I dG > 0), employment 
increases because dE * / dG = (d(3 / dG) x (a positive term) > 0. The 
government in effect forces the market to experience cross-economies 
of scale beyond what is efficient. If there are cross-diseconomies of 
scale (d$/dG<0), employment decreases because 
dE*/dG= (d$ I dG} x (a positive term) < 0 • In this case, the govern 
ment in effect forces the market to experience cross-diseconomies 
beyond what is efficient.
Now assume that legally required fringe benefits already exist. 
What happens to employment if G is increased? Consider the case of 
no cross-scale effects (dft/dG = 0). If G is already set above the mar 
ket equilibrium level, then the marginal cost is above the marginal rev 
enue so that (t| + 2pG) > A. As a result, dE * /dG < 0, implying that 
employment decreases when G is increased. On the other hand, if G 
is initially set below the market equilibrium level, then the marginal 
cost is lower than the marginal revenue so that (T| + 2pG) < A . As a 
result, dE* IdG > 0, implying that employment increases when G is 
increased. With respect to the latter of these policy moves, the govern 
ment forces G to move closer to the market equilibrium level.
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Allowing cross-scale effects to exist complicates the analysis. 
Suppose there are cross-economies of scale (d$ldG > 0). If G is ini 
tially set above the competitivejnarket level, then the effect of changes 
in employment of changes in G is ambiguous given that dE*ldG can 
not be signed. In this case, there are opposing forces at work. On one 
hand, the government forces G to increase beyond its already ineffi 
ciently high level, thereby adversely affecting employment. On the 
other hand, an increase in G forces the market to enjoy cross-econo 
mies of scale, thereby positively affecting employment. The net out 
come depends upon the relative strength of the opposing forces. If G 
is initially below the competitive market level, then employment unam 
biguously increases because dE * IdG < 0. In this case, the govern 
ment forces the market to move towards the competitive level of G, 
thereby reinforcing the stimulating effect on employment originating 
from cross-economies of scale.
_ Turning to the case of cross-diseconomies of scale (d$ldG < 0), if 
G is initially above the competitive market level, then employment 
declines unambiguously when G isjncreased because (d$ldG < 0). 
In this case, the government forces G to move further away from the 
competitive equilibrium, thereby reinforcing the disemployment effect 
caused by cross-diseconomies of scale. If G is initially below the 
competitive market level, then employment effects are ambiguous 
given that dE * IdG cannot be signed. The government forces G closer 
to the market equilibrium level, causing employment to expand, but 
cross-diseconomies of scale cause employment to decline. The net 
effect is uncertain.
To summarize, if an increase in nonwage payments is caused by an 
increase in the legally required benefits, wages fall unambiguously; 
however, employment effects are ambiguous. An important result is 
that, even in the case of an exogenous increase in legally required 
fringe benefits, employment can increase rather than decrease as con 
ventionally thought. Whatever happens to employment, an increase in 
legally mandated fringe benefits tends to be inefficient. An exception 
is when the fringe benefits level is initially set below the competitive 
equilibrium level. In this case, it is obvious that an increase in fringe 
benefits increases efficiency so long as the increase does not overshoot 
the competitive equilibrium level.
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AN EXTENSION: A MODEL WITH OVERTIME HOURS
Previous analyses assume that the relevant range of hours of work 
includes only the standard hours, omitting consideration of overtime 
hours and the potential ramifications of the overtime wage premium. 
Our model may be extended by assuming that the equilibrium num 
ber of hours of work incorporates overtime hours. Such an extension 
is important if exogenous changes in nonwage payments affect the 
marginal cost of increasing the labor input via increases in the hours 
of work beyond the standard hours. We are also interested in the 
effects of changes in the standard hours (or in the overtime wage pre 
mium) on employment and fringe benefits. For a fuller exposition on 
the technical aspects of such an extended model, the reader is referred 
to a companion paper (Hashimoto and Zhao 1996). Here, we simply 
outline some of the key predictions that emerge from this extended 
analysis.
The predictions discussed in the preceding section are generally 
unchanged in the extended model. We do, however, obtain additional 
predictions. First, suppose the government increases the standard 
hours of work. If there are no cross-scale effects, neither fringe bene 
fits nor hours of work are affected by the changes in standard hours. 
Employment increases if the positive effect of the increased standard 
hours on labor demand dominates the negative effect on labor supply; 
it decreases otherwise. The effects on hours of work and fringe bene 
fits depend on how the slope of the labor demand curve, (3, changes. 
The straight-time wage rate rises as a result of an upward shift of the 
worker supply curve. The effects of an increase in the overtime wage 
rate are opposite of the effects of an increase in standard hours.
CONCLUSION
The importance of nonwage payments has risen noticeably in the 
United States over the past 40 years. Contributing to this trend are 
increases in both voluntarily provided and legally required fringe bene 
fits. Furthermore, since the early 1980s, the growth of the voluntary
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component has outpaced that of legally required component. These 
developments suggest the importance of evaluating how employment 
and wages are affected by the demand and supply forces that lead to 
increases in voluntarily provided fringe benefits. This chapter has 
addressed this issue. We find that predictions based upon the conven 
tional firm-level analysis in which nonwage payments are assumed to 
be exogenous are misleading. In particular, contrary to the conven 
tional wisdom, an increase in nonwage payments does not necessarily 
imply any adverse effects on employment and wages.
This outcome depends jointly on the source of the increase and the 
existence of cross-scale effects in the cost of providing fringe benefits. 
If the increase in nonwage payments is the result of either an increase 
in employee demand for fringe benefits or a decrease in the cost of pro 
viding benefits, employment may increase and the wage rate may 
decrease. More importantly, employment effects are ambiguous even 
when legally mandated fringe benefits are involved. To be sure, wages 
always fall when legally required fringe benefits are increased; how 
ever, employment may fall or rise depending on the initial condition 
and the existence and the nature of cross-scale effects.
In the special case in which there are no cross-diseconomies of 
scale, there is no presumption that an increase in nonwage benefits 
reduces employment so long as competitive market forces are respon 
sible for such an increase. If new legally required fringe benefits are 
introduced into a labor market that is already at a competitive equilib 
rium, employment decreases regardless of whether the mandate is to 
increase or decrease such benefits. In this case, a government cannot 
increase employment by manipulating the levels of legally required 
fringe benefits.
Incorporating the distinction between standard hours of work and 
overtime hours of work does not change these results. Not surpris 
ingly, we find that there is a symmetry of effects with respect to the 
standard hours and the overtime premium. In particular, the effects 
of increased standard hours of work on employment, wages, and 
fringe benefits are opposite of the effects of an increased overtime 
premium.
We end with a discussion of some of the restrictions and limita 
tions imposed on the analysis of this paper. Relaxing these would 
undoubtedly make the model more complete. Given, however, that
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our objective is to demonstrate that making nonwage payments endog 
enous changes some of the conventional results, we have chosen to 
use a simplified model here. In any event, four limitations warrant 
mention.
First, we abstract from the worker's choice of the number of hours 
to work. Incorporating such a decision, while making the model more 
complete, would greatly complicate our analysis. The same may be 
said with respect to the second limitation of our analysis—namely, our 
treatment of all nonwage labor as quasi-fixed benefits that are indepen 
dent of the number of hours of work. Thus, we are talking about a 
quasi-fixed wage component that is approximately 20 percent of total 
labor compensation. Third, we abstract from higher order terms in the 
linearly specified demand and supply functions. More complicated 
specifications of the demand and supply curves may be desirable, 
although such extensions are likely to make the predictions ambiguous. 
Fourth, we assume that all employees are homogeneous with respect to 
the marginal value of fringe benefits. If they were made heteroge 
neous, the supply specification would need to incorporate distribution 
parameters determining the taste for fringe benefits. Relaxing these 
four restrictions is the subject of future research. In this chapter, how 
ever, our goal is simply to demonstrate that some of the conventional 
predictions are modified once analysis is conducted in a more general 
equilibrium framework.
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1. When models of employment-hours decisions are expanded to allow for changes 
in capital, many of the results concerning hours become ambiguous; however, 
the fixed-cost effect on employment remains intact (Hamermesh 1993; Hart 
1984).
2. Almost all existing analyses focus on the behavior of firms for which it is reason 
able to assume that fringe benefits are strictly exogenous. For example, see Rosen 
(1968), Ehrenberg (1971), Hamermesh (1993), and Hart (1984).
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3. The second order conditions are given by 3 2 Z/8G2 = -2p£ < 0 and |H| = -2$pE 
-\Q.5E(d$ I dG)]2 > 0,and where |H| is the determinant of the Hessian matrix. It 
is straightforward to show that if the demand curves are all parallel to one another, 
i.e., d$/dG = Q, the above conditions are implied by the assumptions made with 
regard to the demand and supply curves If they are not parallel, these conditions 
must be imposed on the model.
4. Since the L curve is unique to the value of dB/dG, the maximum employment 
level is different for each case.
5. The equilibrium point corresponds to the intersection of the respective demand 
and supply curves. The second order condition is satisfied because d Z*/3E
= p<o.
6. This can be seen from d2 El(dG] =2p/p<0 when G = G*.
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Appendix A
Table A, an extension of Table 1 in Woodbury (1983), gives the data on 
which Figure 1 is based. This appendix describes the procedures used to com 
pute the entries in Table A and in Table 1 of the text. To simplify our exposi 
tion, we begin with a discussion of the construction of Table A.
Woodbury used two sources in demonstrating the growth of employee ben 
efits from 1965 to 1978: the U.S. Chamber of Commerce publication Employee 
Benefits (various years) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) bulletin Em 
ployee Compensation in the Private, Nonfarm Economy (1974). It is helpful to 
discuss each of these sources individually.
The data available in Employee Compensation in the Private, Nonfarm 
Economy is the product of the Employer Expenditures for Employee Compen 
sation survey (EEEC). This survey was discontinued in 1977; however, begin 
ning in March of 1987, the BLS started publication of Employment Cost 
Indexes and Levels (ECI), which includes a measure of "Employer Costs for 
Employee Compensation." 1 The data provided under this heading appears to 
be comparable to that provided in the older publication, from which Table 1 in 
Woodbury (1983) is derived. The one significant difference stressed in Nathan 
(1987) concerns its means of measuring these costs. In particular, the EEEC 
focuses upon past expenditures—or, the actual money an employer spends on 
compensation during a specified time. The compensation levels given in the 
new BLS publication rely upon current costs—or, the annual costs based upon 
the current price of benefits under current plan provisions. Aside from this 
measurement difference, however, the ECI and EEEC appear quite similar, 
with both covering virtually the same benefits and, more importantly, reporting 
costs on the same per hour basis. 2 In addition, the ECI preserves the scope of 
the EEEC by reporting survey coverage of the private, nonfarm workforce.
Derivation of the entries given in the last three columns of Table A simply 
entails the application of the per hour costs reported in the ECI to the defini 
tions utilized by Woodbury in his calculations. These per hour costs are sub 
sequently expressed as a percent of total compensation per hour and indexed to 
equal 100 in 1966.
With respect to the Chamber of Commerce data, a comparison of this table 
with that of Woodbury shows that the pre-1983 entries have been recalculated. 
This is done for reasons of data availability. In particular, the Table 19 that 
Woodbury used to construct his numbers is no longer included in Employee 
Benefits. To construct similar numbers for this table, it is necessary to use other 
sources within the publication. Two of these are selected. The first is a table 
giving wage data by industry (Table 17 in 1967 and 1969, Table 18 through
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Table A Trends in Wage and Nonwage Compensation, 1951-1995 























































Legally per hr. Legally 












































Fringe Benefits and Employment 255
Compensation 















































































a Total Compensation includes legally required contributions to Social Secunty, federal 
and state unemployment insurance, and Workers' Compensation.
b Benefits provided voluntarily by the employer include private insurance (life, health, 
and accidental), privately sponsored retirement and savings plans (pensions, savings 
and thrift plans), as well as other items (severance pay, supplemental unemployment 
benefits, and other miscellaneous benefits).
c Comparable BLS benefits data are unavailable for the period extending from 1975- 
1986.
1984, Table 16 after 1988); the second is a chart detailing average annual em 
ployee benefits and earnings (Chart 2 in all publications). The first of these, 
Table 16, gives average gross payroll for all private industries included in the 
survey not only on an annual basis but also on an hourly basis. That gross pay 
roll is expressed on a per hour basis is important because such a frequency 
makes it possible to construct entries that are compatible with those provided 
by Woodbury (1983). Chart 2 categorizes employee benefits and earnings in 
the following manner: 1) benefits are the sum of outside payroll and inside 
payroll. Inside payroll encompasses paid vacations and holidays, employee 
rest periods, and lunch breaks; outside payroll is made up of legally required 
payments, pensions, insurance, and other agreed upon items, and other bene 
fits; and 2) earnings include total pay for all time worked; they comprise 
straight-time and premium-time pay, a shift differential, production bonuses, 
and other agreed upon items.
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It should be noted that Woodbury could easily make comparisons among his 
entries for the various years because the Table 19 he used in their construction 
was a summary of employee benefits for only those companies submitting data 
over the entire interval of 1957-1977. The entries given in Table A are con 
structed for all companies reporting data in the various years listed. Because 
of changes in the number and composition of companies reporting benefits be 
tween 1951 and 1992 (N = 736 and N = 1194, respectively), these entries are 
not strictly comparable. They do, however, indicate the trend in benefits over 
time. In addition, Woodbury's calculations for supplements (% of total) in 
1967 through 1977 are larger because the average benefits of the few compa 
nies included in the old Table 19 are somewhat higher than those for the full 
sample. The reason for this lies in the fact that those companies reporting over 
the entire period have larger, more established benefits programs than those 
companies included in the full sample but excluded from the Table 19 sample.
A two-step procedure is utilized to construct the entries shown in the first 
three columns of Table A. To begin, the information in Table 16 regarding av 
erage annual and average hourly gross payroll is used to determine the average 
number of hours for which an employee is paid. Given this information, Chart 
2 is employed to determine the average benefits received per hour per employ 
ee. 3 After calculating such benefits on per hour basis, these are applied to 
Woodbury's definitions of the three entries; the results reported in Table A are 
expressed as a percent of total compensation per hour and are indexed to equal 
100 in 1951.
The entries given in Table 1 of the text are derived in a similar manner. In 
this case, however, we take from Table 7 of the Employee Benefits publications 
estimates of the average hourly employer contributions to the following com 
ponents of legally required, voluntary, and inside payroll labor costs: 4 1) So 
cial Security, workers' compensation, and other legally required benefits 
(unemployment insurance, state sickness benefits, etc.); 2) pension plan premi 
ums and retirement savings plan contributions; contributions to employee life, 
death, and medical (and medically related) insurance, as well as miscellaneous 
voluntary benefits (supplemental unemployment insurance, employee dis 
counts on company goods and services, employee meals, childcare, and other 
benefits payments); and 3) paid rest (coffee and meal breaks, setup and wash 
up time, travel time, etc.) and paid leave (paid vacations and holidays, sick 
leave, parental leave, etc.). These benefit costs per hour are in turn expressed 
as a percent of total compensation per hour using data from the first column of 
Table A; the results are subsequently indexed to equal 100 in 1951.
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Notes
1. The ECI was only implemented in stages. Beginning in 1976, published statistics 
covered only quarterly changes in wages and salaries of private, nonfarm workers. 
In 1978, the BLS expanded the survey to include 13 additional statistical series 
(e.g., union/nonunion, manufactunng/nonmanufactunng); by 1980, it had incor 
porated into the survey the publication of quarterly changes in total employee 
compensation. What the BLS Handbook of Methods (Chapter 8, p. 56) terms the 
third stage in the development of the ECI involved the expansion of the survey to 
state and local (not federal) government employees Finally, the most recent 
development in the ECI involves the inclusion of actual compensation costs on a 
per hour basis; the BLS has included these measures in the ECI since March of 
1987.
2. These benefits include paid leave (vacations, holidays, sick leave, and other), sup 
plemental pay (premium pay for overtime and for work on weekends and holi 
days, nonproduction bonuses), insurance benefits (life, health, sickness and 
accident insurance), retirement and savings benefits (pension and other retirement 
plans, savings and thrift plans), legally required benefits (Social Secunty, Work 
ers' Compensation, Unemployment Insurance, and other), and other benefits (sev 
erance pay, supplemental unemployment plans, and employee merchandise 
discounts in department stores).
3. In other words, average benefits received per hour equal the ratio of average 
annual benefits to average hours for which the employee is paid per year.
4. All entries after 1979 are computed from Table 7 of the Employee Benefits publi 
cation (Chamber of Commerce of the United States, various years) for the corre 
sponding year; all pre-1980 entries are computed from Table 7 of Employee 




Derivation of Market Labor Demand Function
Assume that F and C are both quadratic as follows:
F(n) = 1/2 Fnn2 + 6
C(G,ri) = 1/2 Q { G2 + Cl2Gn +
We first show that the individual labor demand functions have the following 
form:
where
A = /?Fn -2(C12 G + <|> 2 ),
To prove the above, note that we have the following expressions:
l
3C > 
C2 = -r— = C12 G + §2 = 0. 
on <
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Now, the firm's labor demand function given by Eq. 4a* is expanded so that
= \pFn - [l/2 Q jG2 + CuGn + (j
= [PFn - (l/2 C, !G2 + <hG + <|)o) - 2(C12 G + 4> 2 )n
As a result,
n = i ("~ Q) (B2)
is the firm's new labor demand function. Note that
so that the right hand side of Eq. B2 is a function of w, parameterized by G and
P-
Next, we show that if all K firms are identical and if the price feedback is
given by p = p(E), pf < 0, , where E = Kn, then the inverse market labor 
demand function has the form
w = T(G) + P(G)E + e(G, E), (B3) 
where
T(G) = [const. - 1/2 q tG2 - (j)^], (B4)
l ], (B5) 
and e(G,£) is an error term.
260 Hashimoto
To prove the above, note that since p=p(E) is a function off, the right-hand 
side of Eq. B2 contains the term E. This implies that the market labor demand 
function cannot be obtained by simply multiplying Eq. B2 by K. Instead, one 
must first gather all the E terms on the left-hand side as follows:
Multiplying Eq. B2 by K, we have
= — (w-Q).
As such,
Substituting Fn = Fnn + Q ,, and p(E) = p0 +p'E+ . . . into the above ex 
pression, we obtain
w = const. —
where e(G,£) is an error term containing all higher order terms of £. Letting 




d 2Note that Eq. B3 is approximated by Eq. 5 as w = a - (TjG + pG ) + p(G)£.
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Appendix C
This appendix describes the logic behind Figure 7. Let us first prove the 
proposition that the competitive equilibrium occurs at the maximum feasible 
level of employment on the L curve only when d$/dG = 0. By solving Eq. 9a 
for E and computing dEldG = 0 to select the maximum employment point, we 
obtain
(t| + 2pG-X)-£(</P/dG) = 0. (Cl)
Now, the competitive equilibrium point on the L curve is now obtained by com 
bining Equations 9a and 9b to obtain
(Tj + 2pG - X) - 0.5E(d$ I dG) = 0. (C2)
Clearly, Equations Cl and C2 are equivalent only when d$/dG = 0; therefore, 
the competitive equilibrium employment level is the maximum employment 
level only when d$/dG = 0.
We now demonstrate the locations of points A, B, and C in Figure 7. Rear 
ranging Eq. 9b, we obtain
(TJ + 2pG - X) = Q.5E(d$ I dG) = 0. (C3)
Assuming that fiPpYdG2 = 0, an increase in G increases the left-hand side of Eq. 
C3; as a result, the right-hand side must also increase. If dft/dG > 0, the right- 
hand side will increase only when E rises. This result implies that, in this case, 
we are at point B in Figure 7. Similarly, if d$/dG < 0, E must decrease when 
G increases; in this case, we must be at point C in Figure 7.
